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Abstract. This paper analyzes the security of VeraCrypt hidden oper-
ating systems. We present attacks on the plausible deniability attribute of
hidden Operating Systems (OSs) created using VeraCrypt. We demon-
strate that the encrypted outer volume can contain information that
compromises the existence of a hidden OS, and the fact that it was run-
ning, even if only one copy of the encrypted drive is examined. To further
investigate this, we show that cross drive analysis, previously used to an-
alyze deniable file systems, can also be applied to prove the presence of a
hidden OS volume and to estimate its size. In addition, we discuss other
attack vectors that can be exploited in relation to cloud and network
information leaks. This paper also examines the security requirements
of a threat model in which the attacker has direct access to a running
hidden OS.
Keywords: Deniable File System, Hidden Operation System, Plausible Denia-
bility, TrueCrypt, VeraCrypt
1 Introduction
A hidden Operating System (OS) is an operating system installed in an en-
crypted hidden volume, using software such as VeraCrypt. The assumption is
that it should be impossible to prove that a hidden volume exists, and therefore
impossible to prove that a hidden operating system exists. This concept is known
as plausible deniability, as the existence of the hidden volume cannot be proven.
This feature was implemented in TrueCrypt/VeraCrypt software as an extension
of Deniable File Systems (DFSs) [10], and is based on deniable encryption which
was introduced by Canetti [2, 11].
One notion of deniable encryption is the ability to decrypt a ciphertext into
two different plaintexts depending on the key that is provided. An additional
property is to ensure that the adversary cannot detect that a hidden message is
present in the ciphertext. The purpose of this is to protect against adversaries
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who are able to force the user to provide a password to decrypt the content,
as the password that is provided will only reveal the decoy message/data while
keeping the true message/data hidden.
Plausible deniability is implemented in TrueCrypt/VeraCrypt via its ability
to create hidden volumes and hidden operating systems. VeraCrypt was devel-
oped based on the original TrueCrypt project. VeraCrypt uses XTS mode for
encrypting partitions, drives and virtual volumes [11]. This mode of operation
is described by Eq. 1; where ⊗ denotes multiplication of two polynomials over
the binary field GF(2) modulo x128 + x7 + x2 +1; K1 is the encryption key; K2
is the secondary encryption key; i is the cipher block index within a data unit;
n is the data unit index within the scope of K1; and a is the primitive element
of Galois Field (2128) that corresponds to polynomial x [11]. This implies that
a change in one bit of the plaintext will result in a change to the entire 8-bytes
(128 bits) data block of the encrypted volume.
Ci = EK1(Piˆ(EK2(n)⊗ ai))ˆ(EK2(n)⊗ ai) (1)
The VeraCrypt documentation provides a guide on how to encrypt a hid-
den OS [11]. A practical implementation consists of two partitions and a boot
loader residing in the first track of a system drive (or a VeraCrypt RescueDisk).
However, this is not a smart solution as the unencrypted boot loader will in-
dicate that the drive is encrypted by VeraCrypt. To overcome this issue there
is an option to create a VeraCrypt rescue disk containing the boot loader, as
depicted in Fig. 1. This will provide plausible deniability as a decoy OS can be
created. Obviously, the system installed on the first partition must not contain
any sensitive files.
Fig. 1. Layout of a drive containing a hidden operating system.
The second partition is also encrypted and can be mounted by the user upon
supplying the second password. The outer volume contains an integrated hidden
volume within which the hidden OS is installed. Existence of the hidden volume,
which is a DFS, cannot be proven via One-Time Access methods (described in
§2). To access the hidden OS, the user must provide the valid password that is
different from the decoy OS volume’s password. The boot loader will first try to
decrypt the decoy OS’s header, and after it is unsuccessful, it will then attempt
to decrypt the hidden OS’s header. What is important is that when running, the
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hidden OS will appear to be installed on the same partition as the decoy OS. All
read/write operations will be transparently redirected from the system partition
to the hidden volume inside the outer volume. The VeraCrypt documentation
asserts that neither the OS nor any application programs will know that all data
is essentially written to and read from the hidden volume [11]. In this paper, we
demonstrate that the above statement is not entirely true, as the presence of the
hidden OS can in fact be revealed.
Our Contribution. In this paper, we analyze the security of VeraCrypt hidden
OSs. While this software allow for plausible deniability via the creation of hidden
OSs, we demonstrate that the encrypted outer volume can contain information
that compromises the existence of a hidden OS. Our results are presented from
the point of view of a new threat model incorporating One-Time Access, Multi-
ple Access and Live Response Access scenarios. This paper presents experiment
results showing that the VeraCrypt hidden OS implementation has faults that
can be exploited to compromise the hidden OS even if an attacker only pos-
sess one binary copy of the drive. In addition, we show that it is vulnerable to
cross drive analysis, which can be used to estimate the size of the hidden OS.
Furthermore, this paper discusses other types of attacks that can be conducted
to reveal the existence of a hidden OS on a device based on the Live Response
Access scenario.
2 Threat Model
This work is based on our previously improved threat model for the security
analysis of Deniable File Systems (DFSs) and hidden Operating Systems (OSs)
[9]. This new model is an improvement on the model proposed by Czeskis et
al. [3], as it addresses the flaws and inconsistencies in the previous model. The
improved threat model is depicted in Fig. 2, in which the attack vectors are de-
fined by One-Time Access, Multiple Access and Live Response Access scenarios.
Compare with the previous model, this new model is much more practical and
suitable for assessing the security of hidden OSs.
The One-Time Access scenario is a situation where an investigator has man-
aged to obtain one or more copies of a device containing only a single copy of
the drive containing a hidden OS [3]. Attack vectors based on this model have
been presented in related work [4, 6, 7]. However, most of these findings are based
on detecting DFSs, but cannot be applied to detecting hidden OSs. This is be-
cause in the case of hidden OSs, the entire drive is encrypted, thus, reducing the
potential sources of information leaks that can compromise the hidden volume.
In a Multiple Access scenario, an investigator has access to multiple device
images containing multiple hidden encrypted containers. The main threat to
DFSs in this scenario lies in possibility of differential analysis for detecting hidden
volumes, as this results in the ability to attack the plausible deniability attribute.
This issue was raised in Czeskis et al. [3], where they highlighted that if disk
snapshots could be obtained at close enough intervals, then the existence of any
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Fig. 2. Threat model and attack vectors on deniable file systems and hidden operating
systems.
deniable files would become obvious. This is due to the fact that examination
using differential analysis can reveal that seemingly random bytes on the hard
drive will change in a non-random fashion. This was practically demonstrated
by Hargreaves and Chivers [6], and research on detecting the creation of DFSs
inside an encrypted container have been presented in Jozwiak [8].
The Live Response Access model is the model that is most suitable for detect-
ing a hidden OS. Examples of such a scenario is when an investigator has direct
live access to a DFS based hidden OS, or has access to the network environ-
ment within which a hidden OS is operating, or has access to cloud applications
in which a hidden OS is connected to. A typically situation will involve an in-
vestigator remotely logging into a system containing a hidden OS using live
response tools or just using standard remote access software like Team Viewer
or VNC. Live response and memory analysis tools have the capabilities of col-
lecting information from network connections, open ports and sockets, running
processes, terminated processes, loaded DLLs, open files, OS kernel modules,
process dumps, strings or user logs [12].
3 Defeating Deniability of Hidden Operating Systems
In this section, we present practical attacks on the deniability of hidden Operat-
ing Systems (OSs). For this, a test environment was created using Oracle Virtual
Box version 5.1.12. A hard drive image size of 50GB was created. However, since
the virtual box operates using the vdi file format with included metadata, its
image had to be converted to a binary RAW format before analysis using com-
puter forensic tools. Both the decoy and hidden OS (MS Windows 10) where
installed using VeraCrypt 1.19. The designed layout of partitions is depicted in
table 1.
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Table 1. Layout of the test environment.
Partition Starting Sector Last Sector Size (MB)
/dev/sda1 2048 1026047 500
/dev/sda2 1026047 43530239 20270
/dev/sda3 43532225 104855551 29240
/dev/sda5 43532288 1048553551 29240
Unallocated 104855552 104857599 1
The first partition, /dev/sda1, was for the Windows Recovery Environment
(WinRE) and was unencrypted. The second partition, /dev/sda2, was the one
on which the decoy operating system was installed; the whole partition was en-
crypted. /dev/sda3 was the extended partition that hosts the /dev/sda5/ par-
tition, which was the completely encrypted outer volume; the hidden OS was
installed within this partition. As the hidden OS was contained within the en-
crypted hidden volume, which was located inside the encrypted outer volume,
plausible deniability necessitates that it should be impossible to prove the exis-
tence of this hidden OS. However, in the next section, we show that plausible
deniability of the VeraCrypt hidden OS is not met even in the simplest threat
model scenario.
3.1 Encrypted Drive Analysis
First, we investigated the possibility of defeating plausible deniability of a Ve-
raCrypt hidden OS under the most basic thread scenario, i.e. the One-Time
Access scenario. An example of such a scenario is when Alice’s computer is
seized by police, who force Alice to reveal the password of the encrypted par-
titions. Alice reveals the password for the decoy OS and for the outer volume.
According to the plausible deniability attribute of the VeraCrypt hidden OS, the
police should not be able to prove that Alice has a hidden OS installed on the
computer, as it is stored in an encrypted hidden volume inside the encrypted
outer volume.
A VeraCrypt hidden OS requires a special uncommon disk layout consisting
of at least two partitions that are both completely encrypted. This information,
in conjunction with the fact that VeraCrypt is installed on the computer under
investigation, can potentially raise the suspicion of the police to the presence of a
hidden OS. Nevertheless, this can reasonably be explained by Alice as the need to
separate the system and documents into separate partitions. However, any solid
indication that a hidden OS is installed on the computer under investigation is
sufficient to defeat plausible deniability.
We conducted randomness testing to check for artifacts in the outer volume.
The reason for this is because if a hidden OS is running inside a completely
encrypted hidden volume that is located within an outer volume, which is also
completely encrypted, no pseudo-random anomalies should be found. When we
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performed entropy analysis on the outer volume, it showed that most of the
examined data had values between 7.9978 and 7.9986, which represent expected
values from correctly encrypted cipher text data. However, we were able to ob-
serve some unexpected values in specific sectors that were occupied by the outer
volume. In particular, there were two areas which clearly showed significantly
lower entropy values of 7.9966 and 7.997, as can be seen in the plot provided in
fig. 3.
Fig. 3. Areas with significantly lower entropy inside the outer encrypted volume.
The first of these observed areas was located in sector number 61345696, and
the second was located 45928448 bytes later in sector number 61435400. Both
of these sectors are located within the /dev/sda5 partition, which was within
the completely encrypted outer volume. The hidden volume hosting the hidden
OS had a size of 42504191 sectors. This could infer that the lower entropy areas
indicate the beginning and end of the hidden volume hosting the hidden OS.
Presence of these areas violates the plausible deniability of the existence of a
VeraCrypt hidden OS.
Both areas are exactly 512 bytes in length and consist of “00” bytes and
strings, and the path to the “\windows\system32\winload.exe” file, refer to fig.
4. Cross drive analysis showed that the second area correlates to running the
hidden OS. Three bytes at offset 61435400 are altered every time the hidden
OS is started. This is highlighted in fig. 4, the bytes 90 90 00 change to CD 1E
01 whenever the hidden OS is started. A VeraCrypt ciphertext block size is 16
bytes (128 bits), this indicates that this area is not overwritten by the VeraCrypt
encryption algorithm.
In summary, an investigator can easily find these areas in a One-Time Ac-
cess threat model scenario. The presence of these areas is correlated with the
existence of a hidden OS, and thus violates the plausible deniability attribute of
a VeraCrypt hidden OS. Furthermore, if an investigator is able to compare this
area with binary snapshots taken over an interval of time (i.e. in the case of a
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Fig. 4. Lower entropy areas.
Multiple Access model), this can provide strong evidence as to the running of a
hidden OS on the computer.
3.2 Cross Drive Analysis
In this section, we demonstrate a method of defeating plausible deniability of
a VeraCrypt hidden OS in the case of a Multiple Access threat model. This
scenario assumes that an investigator is in possession of multiple binary copies
of Alice’s computer hard drive that were taken over several time intervals during
which Alice was using either the decoy OS or the hidden OS. This method has
previously been used in DFSs for detecting the existence of TrueCrypt hidden
volumes on a drive under investigation [6]. Our research adopts this method for
detecting the presence of a VeraCrypt hidden OS.
First, we split the binary images of the investigated drives into 1000MB
blocks. Then the SHA1 of each block was computed. This was done under the
assumption that this will help narrow down the analysis from a 50GB image to
smaller parts of the drive where data actually changes, which was true in the
case of analyzing TrueCrypt hidden volumes [6]. It turns out that running a
VeraCrypt OS’s “on the fly” encryption (even when the OS is idle) writes large
amounts of data, which distributes changes over the whole system partition.
VeraCrypt statistics estimate that 17, 33, and 520 MBs of data written on an
encrypted volume correspond to 1 minute, 2 minute and 5 minute intervals
[11]. Analysis of the cryptographic hash function values clearly showed that
mismatched blocks in the case of running the decoy OS are placed in the first
half of the investigated drive image. This is in contrast to running the hidden OS,
which changes only the second half of the drive image. We performed a detailed
comparison of changes in each corresponding data block, and a visual depiction
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of this is presented in fig. 5. In fig. 5, every rectangle represents a 1000MB block
of the binary image from the investigated drive (except for the last block which
is 200MB in size). The first block is on the upper left, while the last block is
on the lower right. The data that changed during the running of the decoy and
hidden OSs are depicted as the horizontal gray lines.
Fig. 5. A visual depiction of changes that were made to the volume while running the
decoy OS (left) and hidden OS (right).
The experiment started with the creation of the binary images of the inves-
tigated drive containing both the installed decoy and hidden OSs. Then, virtual
machines were cloned, switched on and immediately turned off for the decoy OS
and a second clone for the hidden OS. While running the decoy OS, only data
on the second portion changed. Whereas, running the hidden OS only resulted
in changes in the outer volume, located in the third partition. Analyzing the
first change sector offset (62351360) and the last sector (103601344) allows for
an estimation of the hidden OS partition size. In the case of the experiment, it
was estimated as 19.7GB, which compares favorably with the actual hidden OS
partition size of 20.26GB. It is assumed that a more accurate estimation can be
made if we didn’t just turn the OSs on and off, but allowed the OSs to operate
for some time.
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In summary, this demonstrates that cross drive analysis can uncover evidence
that a hidden OS is running on an investigated drive based on analysis of changes
in the encrypted drive.
3.3 Other Attack Vectors
Hidden OS by design are intended to ensure plausible deniability, especially in
the case of a One-Time Access model. In the previous section, we demonstrated
that they are vulnerable to Multiple Access attacks. In this section, we discuss
attack vectors based on the Live Response Access scenario. This is based on
the situation where an investigator has live access to the running hidden OS
or to the network/cloud environment within which the hidden OS is operating.
Our purpose is to reveal any information that can lead to proving that either a
decoy or a hidden OS is running. Despite information provided in the VeraCrypt
documentation that asserts that neither the OS nor any application programs
will know that all data is essentially written to and read from the hidden volume
[11], we discovered that even non-privilege level applications can reveal some
information that can be used to detect a hidden OS.
Right after logging into the hidden OS, a pop-up message informing the user
that “for security reasons, when a hidden operating system is running, local un-
encrypted file systems and non-hidden VeraCrypt volumes are mounted as read-
only”, which gives away the fact that the system is running a hidden OS. In ad-
dition, when configuration files located in the %APPDATA%\VeraCrypt\folder
from both the decoy and hidden OSs are compared, there is a configuration key
named “HiddenSystemLeakProtNotifStatus” that is initially set to “1”, while
no such key exists in the decoy OS’s configuration file. There is an option to
disable the pop-up message, however, upon disabling this message, the configu-
ration key will change to “2”. This is simple proof that the hidden OS is running.
Moreover, when comparing the configurations files, there are clear differences.
The hidden OS’s configuration file has 58 lines, whereas by default, the decoy
OS’s configuration file only has 10. While this by itself cannot be treated as hard
evidence, it potentially leaks information.
Another indication that a hidden OS is running can be obtained from mounted
volume information that the user can retrieve from the VeraCrypt GUI. By de-
fault, a decoy OS runs from an encrypted volume named “System partition”
with type “System”, whereas a hidden OS runs from a volume mounted with
the name “Hidden system partition” with type “Hidden”. This is shown in fig.6.
Even a standard user account is able to obtain this information. If an investiga-
tor has administrative rights, it is highly likely that additional information can
be obtained by analyzing processes and drives on the kernel.
Another class of attack is based on network/cloud environment information
leaks. Modern operating systems are enhanced by default in cloud based mech-
anisms to make work easier for the user. An example of this is the Microsoft
account that involves signing into one account for all devices. This information
and the number of login attempts are recorded and stored on user account in-
formation which can easily be accessed. In our tests we also checked the Apple
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Fig. 6. VeraCrypt GUI while running a hidden OS.
ID, which is used to log into Apple’s iCloud as well as Google’s single sign on
account.
The use of both the decoy and hidden OSs is visible in the account logs and
this can be an easy way to prove that another OS is installed on the device by
simply observing that two OSs are registered and used concurrently on the same
device. Combining this information with forensic analysis indicating that only
one OS is present on the device and that the drive structure is capable of running
a DFS hidden OS, can be used to prove the existence of a hidden OS. Similar
attacks can be performed by comparing browser fingerprints. These types of web
tracking techniques are described in [1, 5]. We conducted a series of tests which
confirm that this method can indeed be used to reveal the presence of a hidden
OS.
Information that can compromise the existence of a hidden OS can also be
obtained from monitoring device network traffic. An attacker can use both pas-
sive and active OS identification techniques. As with cloud based information
leaks, these techniques can easily reveal the existence of a hidden OS if the user
runs different OS types. Techniques for detecting hidden OSs can also include
forensic analysis of decoy OSs by indexing application versions and network ser-
vices and comparing these with intercepted network traffic. Any unusual traffic
from the same IP and MAC, but with applications and services not present in
the decoy OS can lead to the conclusion that a hidden OS must be installed on
the device.
4 Conclusion
This paper demonstrates that the implementation of the VeraCrypt hidden op-
erating system has faults that can be exploited to compromise the plausible
deniability attribute of the hidden OS even if an attacker only possess one bi-
nary copy of the drive. This paper also presents experiment results showing that
the VeraCrypt hidden OS is vulnerable to cross drive analysis. This is because
even if the OS is idle, it still performs large amounts of read/write operations
that distribute changes to the entire partition area. Simply turning the hidden
OS on and off generates enough changes in the binary image to estimate the
size of the hidden OS. In addition, we discuss other types of attacks based on
the Live Response Access model that can be used to reveal the existence of a
hidden OS. Current hidden OS implementations do not cater for the possibility
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of cloud and network applications, which result in information leaks that can be
exploited to prove that a hidden OS is installed on a device.
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